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Abstract 
 
The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which 
capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we 
investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from 
on-balance sheet positions for European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks. Previous 
research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. 
On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face 
higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as 
measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of 
illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that 
small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. 
Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios 
concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also 
shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how 
to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Liquidity transformation is traditionally considered the preeminent function of banks, 
but also the primary source of their vulnerability and a justification for their protection 
through a public safety net in the form of deposit insurance (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983). Indeed, an important role of banks in the economy is to provide liquidity by 
funding long-term, illiquid assets with short-term, liquid liabilities. Thus, banks hold illiquid 
assets and provide cash to the rest of the economy. Therefore, they face risk if some liabilities 
invested in illiquid assets are claimed at short notice. The subprime crisis well illustrates how 
quickly and severely illiquidity can crystallize. In particular, it shows how some sources of 
funding can evaporate, compounding concerns about the valuation of assets and capital 
adequacy rules (BIS, 2009). 
The existing theoretical and empirical literature considers the causal link that goes 
from bank capital to liquidity creation. The theoretical literature provides two opposing views 
on this relationship. As discussed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), under the first view, bank 
capital tends to impede liquidity creation through two distinct effects: the “financial fragility 
structure” and the “crowding-out of deposits”. According to the “financial fragility structure”, 
higher capital is associated with less monitoring which leads to less liquidity creation 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001), while higher capital ratios could crowd out deposits and 
thereby reduce liquidity creation (Gorton and Winton, 2000). Under the second view, higher 
capital enhances the ability of banks to create liquidity because it allows them to absorb 
greater risk (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden 2004).  
While theory suggests a causal relationship from capital to liquidity creation, in 
practice, the issue is more complex and both might be jointly determined1. Indeed, the more 
banks create liquidity, the more they are exposed to the risk of being unable to meet 
unexpected withdrawals from customers. Thus, banks may need to strengthen their solvency 
to access external funding more easily or, in extreme cases, to face unexpected losses from 
selling some assets at fire-sale prices (Matz and Neu, 2007).  
Banks must comply with capital standards through minimum requirements for risk 
weighted capital ratios. However, most banks hold an amount of capital that exceeds the 
minimum imposed by regulation. From this perspective, various studies investigate why 
                                                 
1 Berger and Bouwman (2009) point out this endogeneity issue. Consequently, they interpret their results as 
correlations between capital and liquidity creation rather than causal relationships. Their study focuses on the 
determinants of liquidity creation. Capital is one of their independent variables, and they address endogeneity 
using instrumental variable regressions. 
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banks buildup such capital buffers (Lindquist, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Ayuso et al., 
2004). However, this literature does not consider the role of liquidity in analyzing bank 
regulatory capital buffer. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between bank regulatory capital 
ratios and liquidity. We study the contribution of liquidity in explaining bank regulatory 
capital ratios beyond the determinants considered in the literature. Specifically, we question 
whether banks maintain or strengthen their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher 
illiquidity. In this context, we hypothesize that banks might strengthen their solvency 
standards to offset their liquidity constraint and improve their ability to raise external funds. 
In addition, banks might raise their capital standards to better assume the losses from selling 
illiquid assets to repay the liabilities claimed on demand. If the hypothesis is rejected—that is, 
if banks do not adjust and improve their capital standards when facing higher illiquidity—
liquidity requirements concomitant to capital standards might be needed to temper the overall 
riskiness of banks. From this perspective, we also contribute to the debate on liquidity 
regulation implemented in the Basel III regulatory framework2. 
We extend the current literature in several directions. First, we add to the strand of the 
existing empirical literature on bank capital buffer, in that liquidity has not yet been 
considered a determinant of capital buffer. Second, to be consistent with recent empirical 
findings showing that bank capital and liquidity might be jointly determined, we estimate a 
simultaneous equations model. Third, we consider both a liquidity creation indicator in the 
steps of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and a liquidity indicator in line with the definition of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision (i.e., the net stable funding 
ratio). The net stable funding ratio shows to what extent a bank is able to meet its liquidity 
requirements without borrowing money or selling its assets at a loss. This measure accounts 
for the imbalances of both sides of bank balance sheets and enables regulators to better assess 
the ability of banks to meet unexpected customer withdrawals from their liquid assets. The 
main difference between the liquidity creation indicator and the liquidity indicator as defined 
in the Basel III accords stems from the liability side of the balance sheets. The liquidity 
creation indicator considers some liabilities as liquid because they can be quickly withdrawn 
                                                 
2 Two regulatory standards for liquidity have been introduced (BIS, 2009). The “net stable funding ratio” 
identifies the amount of long-term, stable sources of funding an institution uses relative to the liquidity profiles 
of its assets and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity arising from off-balance-sheet 
commitments and obligations. The standard requires a minimum amount of funding that is expected to be stable 
over a one year-time horizon based on liquidity factors assigned to assets and off-balance-sheet commitments. 
The Basel Committee has also introduced the “liquidity coverage ratio” to promote the short-term resiliency of 
the liquidity profile of institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high-quality liquid resources to survive 
an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. 
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without penalty. However, a large share of these liquid liabilities is considered as stable in the 
Basel III liquidity indicator because they are expected to "stay" within the institution. From 
these two approaches to measure bank liquidity, we investigate how bank managers deal with 
the stability of their funding in the definition of bank liquidity. We measure the liquidity 
created by banks or their exposure to liquidity risk only from on-balance sheet positions 
because a detailed breakdown of off-balance sheets is not available in standard databases for 
European banks. This could alter our results for large banks because they are generally more 
involved in off-balance sheet activities, and specifically in sophisticated instruments, than 
small banks3. Finally, we also add to the literature by assessing the accuracy of improving the 
regulatory framework by adding liquidity requirements to capital standards.  
Our investigation requires market data and a detailed breakdown of bank balance 
sheets to compute liquidity indicators. This information is more frequently and extensively 
reported for listed banks in standard databases. Our sample is therefore limited to publicly 
traded U.S. and European commercial banks4 during the pre-crisis 2000–2006. We omit the 
crisis years 2007 and 2008 that are likely to disturb our analysis. The main results show that 
banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in 
the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman 
(2009). However, considering a different definition of stable liabilities specific to U.S. banks 
based on the concept of core deposits, the results show that small banks actually increase their 
regulatory capital ratios when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. The findings support the 
need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the 
Basel Committee. Nevertheless, the results also shed light on the need to further clarify how 
to define and measure illiquidity. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing 
literature on bank liquidity creation and on the determinants of bank capital buffer. Section 3 
                                                 
3 In their empirical study on the determinants of liquidity creation, Berger and Bouwman (2009) indicate that 
their results differ for large banks but not for small banks when they account for off-balance sheet positions. 
More precisely, for large banks, capital and liquidity creation are positively correlated when they use measures 
that include off-balance sheet activities, while the relationship is insignificant when those activities are excluded. 
For small banks, capital and liquidity creation are negatively correlated using measures with or without off-
balance sheet activities. 
4 Some of these banks perform non-commercial banking activities (e.g., JP Morgan Chase owns one of the 
largest hedge funds in the United States). We carry out robustness checks by running estimations on a sub-
sample limited to “true commercial banks”. We exclude a bank if it is very small (total assets below $25 million) 
or if it has consumer loans exceeding 50% of total assets. Besides, we verify that our sample does not include a 
bank with no loans outstanding, zero deposits or zero or negative equity capital. For further details, see section 6. 
In all cases, the main conclusions are consistent with those obtained with our full sample of banks. 
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presents the dataset and the empirical strategy, while section 4 describes the variables 
considered in the analysis. Results and robustness checks are presented in sections 5 and 6. 
Section 7 presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Related literature  
 
Our research is related to two strands of literature: the theories linking bank capital 
and liquidity creation and studies focusing on the determinants of bank capital buffer. Several 
theory papers deal with the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. In their 
work, Berger and Bouwman (2009) note that two hypotheses largely frame the discussion on 
this relationship: the “financial fragility/crowding-out” hypothesis and the “risk absorption” 
hypothesis.  
Roughly described5, the “financial fragility structure” effect is the outcome of the 
following process. The bank collects funds from depositors and lends them to borrowers. By 
monitoring borrowers, the bank obtains private information that gives it an advantage in 
assessing the profitability of its borrowers. However, this informational advantage creates an 
agency problem, and the bank might extort rents from its depositors by requiring a greater 
share of the loan income. If depositors refuse to pay the higher cost, the bank withholds 
monitoring or loan-collecting efforts. Because depositors know that the bank might abuse 
their trust, they become reluctant to put their money in the bank. Consequently, the bank must 
win depositors’ confidence by adopting a fragile financial structure with a large share of 
liquid deposits. A contract with depositors mitigates the bank’s hold-up problem because 
depositors can run on the bank if the bank threatens to withhold efforts. Consequently, 
financial fragility favors liquidity creation in that it allows the bank to collect more deposits 
and grant more loans. In contrast, higher capital tends to mitigate the financial fragility and 
enhances the bargaining power of the bank, which hampers the credibility of its commitment 
to depositors. Thus, higher capital tends to decrease liquidity creation. In addition, Gorton and 
Winton (2000) show that a higher capital ratio can reduce liquidity creation through another 
effect: the “crowding-out of deposits”. They maintain that deposits are more effective 
liquidity hedges for agents than investments in bank equity. Indeed, deposits are totally or 
partially insured and withdrawable at par value. In contrast, bank capital is not exigible and 
has a stochastic value that depends on the state of bank fundamentals and the liquidity of the 
                                                 
5 See Berger and Bouwman (2009) for a longer discussion on the “financial fragility structure” and the 
“crowding-out of deposits” effects. 
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stock exchange. Consequently, higher capital ratios shift investors’ funds from relatively 
liquid deposits to relatively illiquid bank capital. Thus, the higher is the bank's capital ratio, 
the lower is its liquidity creation.  
Under the second hypothesis, higher capital enhances the ability of banks to create 
liquidity. Here, liquidity creation increases the bank’s exposure to risk, as its losses increase 
with the level of illiquid assets to satisfy the liquidity demands of customers (Allen and Gale, 
2004). Bank capital allows the bank to absorb greater risk (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; 
Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden 2004). Thus, the higher is the bank's capital ratio, the higher is 
its liquidity creation.  
Berger and Bouwman (2009) empirically test these recent theories of the relationship 
between capital and liquidity creation. Using a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 1993 
to 2003, they find that the relationship is positive for large banks when liquidity creation 
includes off-balance sheet activities and not significant when liquidity creation only accounts 
for on-balance sheet activities. The relationship is significantly negative for small banks 
considering both liquidity creation measures.  
Besides, the liquidity creation indicator developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
has been used in several other studies to investigate different issues. Fungacova et al. (2010) 
examine how the introduction of deposit insurance influences the relationship between bank 
capital and liquidity creation. They test the two competing hypotheses highlighted by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009) using a sample of Russian banks from 1999 to 2007. They find that the 
implementation of deposit insurance has a limited impact on the relationship between bank 
capital and liquidity creation and does not change the negative sign of the relationship. 
Angora and Roulet (2011) use the Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation and the 
Basel III net stable funding (BIS, 2009) measures on a sample of U.S. and European publicly 
traded commercial banks during the 2000–2008 period. They show that European banks and 
large U.S. banks create higher levels of liquidity and are more exposed to maturity 
transformation risk than small U.S. banks. Typically, the results show that banks’ size 
explains the differences in liquidity creation and in maturity transformation risk. Horvath et 
al. (2012) investigate the relationship between capital and liquidity creation by performing 
Granger-causality tests for a sample of Czech banks from 2000 to 2010. They show that 
capital and liquidity creation negatively Granger-cause each other and highlight a trade-off 
between higher financial stability provided by stronger capital requirements and the benefits 
stemming from higher liquidity creation. Besides, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2012) investigate 
the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit 
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risk. They use a sample of virtually all U.S. commercial banks during the 1998-2010 period. 
They consider the liquidity creation indicator of Berger and Bouwman (2009) as a proxy of 
liquidity risk. Overall, they find that both liquidity and credit risks contribute to bank default. 
They also show that the simultaneous occurrence of both risk factors increases bank default 
risk. Finally, Berger et al. (2012) study the effects of regulatory interventions and capital 
support on bank risk taking and liquidity creation using a unique dataset over the 1999-2009 
period They find that both types of actions are generally associated with statistically-
significant reductions in risk taking and liquidity creation in the short and long run. 
 
Turning to the empirical literature on the determinants of bank capital buffer, the 
studies mainly focus on the relationship between a given determinant and bank capital buffer 
by controlling for other potential determinants. From this perspective, Lindquist (2004) uses 
Norwegian banks to study the impact of the riskiness of bank assets on capital buffer. 
Regulatory capital requirements are only based on credit, market and operational risks and do 
not cover all types of risk. Furthermore, sophisticated risk valuation models might 
underestimate risk. Therefore, banks might hold capital in excess of the minimum required by 
regulators so they can face unexpected losses from their risky assets. However, Lindquist 
(2004) does not find any significant link. Jokipii and Milne (2011) also focus on the 
relationship between risk and bank capital buffer, but they examine the relationship between 
capital buffer and portfolio risk adjustments. Using U.S. bank holding companies and 
commercial banks over the 1986–2006 period, they find a positive two-way relationship. 
Several studies investigate how the business cycle might influence bank capital buffer, as 
much debate on Basel capital standards has centered on its potential “pro-cyclicality”. Ayuso 
et al. (2004) and Stolz and Wedow (2011) consider Spanish and German banks, respectively. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) focus on banks from 29 OECD 
countries and from 25 European countries, respectively. Their results globally highlight a 
significant negative co-movement with the cycle. Banks tend to decrease (increase) their 
capital buffer during upturns (downturns). Other studies consider the impact of market 
discipline in the determination of bank capital buffer. They empirically test whether market 
discipline provides enough incentives for banks to strengthen their capital buffer to mitigate 
their default risk. For example, Flannery and Rangan (2008) study the causes of the bank 
capital buildup of the 1990s for large U.S. banks. They find that among the relevant factors, 
market discipline explains the bulk of this buildup. Alfon et al. (2004) and Nier and Baumann 
(2006), using a sample of UK banks and a large cross-country panel data set from 32 
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countries, respectively, show that moral hazard is effective and that market discipline 
encourages banks to strengthen their capital buffer. Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) consider 
cross country data from 70 countries and investigate whether the influence of market 
discipline on capital buffer varies across countries with heterogeneous frameworks for 
regulation, supervision and institutions. They find that, even if market discipline has a 
positive impact on bank capital buffer, the relationship depends on several structural factors. 
Indeed, restrictions on bank activities, effective supervision and bad institutional environment 
tend to weaken market discipline and reduce incentives for banks to hold capital in excess of 
the minimum required by regulators. 
 
3. Sample and empirical method 
 
3.1. Presentation of the sample 
 
Our sample includes U.S. and European6 publicly traded commercial banks over the 
2000–2006 period. We deliberately omit the crisis years 2007 and 2008 that are likely to 
disturb our analysis. We consider U.S. and European banks because the required data are 
available on standard databases to ensure an accurate representativeness of the sample of 
banks in each country. Furthermore, we include only listed banks because the setting requires 
market data (i.e., market value of assets, dividends) and a detailed breakdown of bank balance 
sheets to compute liquidity indicators. In standard databases, this information is more 
frequently and extensively reported for listed banks.  
Annual consolidated financial statements were extracted from Bloomberg. We also 
consider data from the World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and Supervisory Database (Barth et al., 
2007) to compute an indicator of regulatory oversight of bank capital. 
From 2000 to 2006, we identify 870 listed commercial banks (645 in the United States 
and 225 in Europe). To enable the liquidity indicator computation, we restrict the sample to 
banks for which the breakdown for loans by category and the breakdown for deposits by 
maturity were available in Bloomberg or in annual reports. We also delete a bank if its total 
                                                 
6 The sample includes banks from the 27 EU member countries, Norway and Switzerland. However, the required 
data are available only for banks located in the 20 following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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regulatory capital ratio is lower than the regulatory minimum requirement7. Such a bank is 
likely to behave very differently from banks that are in compliance because it is under close 
regulatory scrutiny and it might face constraints on its activities. Our final sample consists of 
781 commercial banks (574 in the United States and 207 in Europe). Table 1 presents the 
distribution of banks by country and the representativeness of the sample. We compare 
aggregate total assets of banks included in the final sample with aggregate total assets of the 
whole banking system. Over the 2000–2006 period, the final sample accounts, on average, for 
66.4% of the total assets of U.S. commercial banks as reported by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 60.4% of the total assets of European commercial banks as 
reported by central banks. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 presents some general descriptive statistics of the final sample including U.S. 
and European banks. By using several key accounting ratios, the data highlight that banks are 
on average focused on traditional intermediation activities. However, there is a high 
heterogeneity across banks according to their size. The data show that small banks8 both in 
Europe and in the United States are on average more focused on traditional intermediation 
activities than large banks. The average share of loans in total assets is 65.4% on the whole 
sample of banks, and respectively 63.5% for large U.S. banks, 63.2% for large European 
banks, 67.6% for small U.S. banks and 67.9% for small European banks. The average ratio of 
total deposits to total assets is 70.7% on the whole sample but it conceals large differences 
between banks. For large banks, the average ratio of total deposits to total assets is 73.9% in 
the U.S. and 47.6% in Europe. The average ratio of total deposits to total assets of small U.S. 
banks is 90.7% and 69.1% for small European banks. In addition, average interest income 
accounts for nearly three-quarters of total income (72%). However, there is a high 
heterogeneity across banks, as shown by the high standard deviation and extreme values of 
                                                 
7 We take in account that regulators set the minimum requirement at 8% for the ratio of Tier 1 and 2 capital to 
total risk weighted assets, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it can be 
considered equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne (2008). Regarding the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk 
weighted assets, the minimum requirement is at 4% in all countries. 
8 Following the literature, a bank is considered small if its total assets are below US$1 billion. Considering U.S 
banks, the sample includes 357 banks with total assets below US$1 billion of a total of 574 U.S. banks. This 
accounts for 62.2% of the total number of U.S. banks in our sample. Considering European banks, the sample 
includes only 37 banks with total assets below US$1 billion of a total of 207 European banks. These banks 
represent only 17.8% of the total number of European banks in our sample.  
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each ratio. Considering the ratios of total loans to total assets and total deposits to total assets, 
minimum values are respectively equal to 4.8% and 4.1%. We check that these very low 
minima are not outliers but prevail for several large European banks. We therefore keep these 
observations in the panel. Regarding the quality of bank assets, the average share of loan loss 
provisions in total loans is 0.4%. Considering profitability, the average return on assets is 
equal to 0.9%. Last, in terms of capitalization, the average risk weighted capital ratio is at 
13.4%, and the average ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets is 8.4%. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
3.2. The model and regression framework 
 
In this paper, we investigate the contribution of liquidity in explaining bank regulatory 
capital buffer beyond the determinants considered in the existing literature. Regulatory capital 
buffer is defined as the amount of capital a bank holds in excess of the minimum required to 
meet regulatory standards. In most of the countries of the sample, regulators set the minimum 
requirement at 8%. Thus, total regulatory capital buffer is the difference between the total 
regulatory capital ratio (i.e., the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets) and a 
constant (8%). To simplify, we use the total regulatory capital ratio instead of total regulatory 
capital buffer9. Previous studies show that bank capital might also be a determinant of bank 
liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Thus to deal with endogeneity, we consider a 
simultaneous equations model. In the first equation (i.e., the regulatory capital equation), we 
regress the regulatory capital ratio on a set of factors identified in the previous literature, to 
which we add liquidity variables using several proxies. In the second equation (i.e., the 
liquidity equation), we regress the liquidity variable on a set of independent variables 
identified in previous literature. The empirical model is specified by the following 
simultaneous equations system (noted as system (1); subscripts i and t denoting bank and 
period, respectively): 
 
                                                 
9 In section 6, we perform robustness checks considering bank regulatory capital buffers instead of bank 
regulatory capital ratios. We take in account that regulators set the minimum requirement at 8%, except in 
Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it is equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne 
(2008). Our results are consistent with those obtained considering the bank regulatory capital ratio. 
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Previous empirical studies on capital buffer and liquidity respectively highlight 
potential endogeneity issues with some explanatory variables and specifically with most of 
the bank level indicators. To address such issues10 and following Lindquist (2004), in both the 
regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, we replace all bank-level explanatory variables 
which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature by their one-year lagged value11. 
K_RWA and L correspond respectively to the regulatory capital ratio and to the liquidity 
proxy. DKj and DLn are respectively the j
th and the nth exogenous determinants of the 
regulatory capital ratio and liquidity. DKk and DLm are respectively the k
th and the mth 
presumably endogenous determinants of the regulatory capital ratio and liquidity. 
We estimate system (1) considering the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
Considering this estimation method has two advantages. It is robust to the distribution of 
errors and it is considered more efficient than two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
because it accounts for the heteroskedasticity of errors (Hall, 2005). After testing for cross-
section and time fixed versus random effects, we include cross-section and time fixed effects 
in the regressions. 
 
4. Definition of variables 
 
4.1. Regulatory capital ratios 
 
The total regulatory capital ratio is defined as the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to 
risk weighted assets (T12_RWA). For deeper insights, we consider an alternative measure of 
the regulatory capital ratio. This is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
(T1_RWA). Tier 1 capital consists of better quality capital and banks might be managing the 
different components of regulatory capital differently. 
                                                 
10 Hausman tests are run for endogeneity by considering each equation of the system individually. The tests 
confirm the presence of endogeneity both in the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations. 
11 We check that the one year lagged values of the presumably endogenous variables are not weak instruments. 
However, more lags of these variables are not introduced in the regressions as they are weak instruments. 
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Since bank capital and liquidity creation might be jointly determined, the regulatory 
capital ratio (K_RWA) is the dependent variable in the regulatory capital equation of system 
(1) and an explanatory variable in the liquidity equation of this system12. As discussed above, 
the theoretical literature provides two opposite views of the impact of capital on liquidity 
creation. The “financial fragility hypothesis” (Diamond and Rajan, 2000 and 2001) and the 
“deposit crowding-out hypothesis” (Gorton and Winton, 2000) predict that higher capital will 
decrease bank liquidity creation. However, the “risk absorption hypothesis” postulates that 
higher capital will increase bank liquidity creation. Thus, the expected sign for the coefficient 
of this variable is ambiguous in the liquidity equation. 
 
4.2. Measures of liquidity 
 
In the banking literature, most empirical studies that consider liquidity indicators use 
ratios computed from accounting data (i.e., consistent with liquidity indicators of the 
CAMELS rating approach). However, as argued by Poorman and Blake (2005), using such 
liquidity ratios could be inaccurate under certain conditions. For example, a large regional 
bank such as the Southeast Bank of Miami, with a ratio of liquid assets to total assets above 
30%, bankrupted in September 1991 because of its inability to repay some liabilities claimed 
on demand with its liquid assets13. In addition, given the development of bank market 
activities, the cash value of assets that could be monetized and the availability of market 
funding are essential to assess bank liquidity. To deal with such issues, some empirical studies 
use synthetic liquidity indicators that include, in addition to the information provided by 
accounting data on the liquidity profile of banks, information about the cash value of assets 
that could be monetized and about the availability of market funding to determine the 
liquidity of bank assets and liabilities (Deep and Schaefer, 2004; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; 
BIS, 2009). Using this literature emphasizing the use of such synthetic indicators and 
considering the Basel III international framework for liquidity assessment in banking, we use 
                                                 
12 K_RWA is either the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets (T12_RWA) or the ratio of Tier 1 capital 
to risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). 
13 The Southeast Bank of Miami had experienced significant problems as a result of concentrated lending in 
commercial real estate and weak underwriting and credit administration practices. As of August 31, 1991, real 
estate loans at Southeast Bank of Miami totaled US$3.5 billion, or 45% of the bank’s total loan portfolio, and 
nonperforming assets equaled 10% of loans. Southeast Bank of Miami reported a loss of US$116.6 million for 
the first quarter and US$139 million for the second quarter of 1991. The announcement of these huge losses 
caused more depositors to withdraw their funds, and the bank’s liquidity problems grew worse. Finally, the bank 
was closed on September 19, 1991, when it was unable to repay a loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta. 
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the following two proxies: a liquidity creation indicator (LC) and the inverse14 of the Basel III 
net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR)15. We measure the liquidity created by banks or their 
exposure to liquidity risk only from on-balance sheet positions because a detailed breakdown 
of off-balance sheets is not available in standard databases for European banks. However, 
bank liquidity might be affected by on- and off-balance sheets positions. Indeed, banks can 
also create liquidity off the balance sheet through loan commitments to customers and similar 
claims to liquid funds. In addition, the potential contingent calls on funding liquidity arising 
from off-balance sheet commitments and obligations can generate lack of liquidity and thus 
increase bank illiquidity. In Berger and Bouwman (2009), liquidity creation is computed with 
a method similar to ours by using on-balance sheet information only but also by adding off-
balance sheet items. Berger and Bouwman (2009) document that large and small banks create 
liquidity in very different ways considering alternately a narrow liquidity creation indicator 
limited to on-balance sheet positions and a broader indicator that also includes off-balance 
sheet positions. They show that for U.S. banks, as of 2003, unused loan commitments amount 
to 48% of the total liquidity created by large banks while they only account for 19% of the 
liquidity created by small banks. Regarding the impact of bank capital on liquidity creation, 
their results differ when they account for off-balance sheet positions for large banks. Indeed, 
the authors find a positive and significant relationship between capital and liquidity creation 
for large banks only when they consider their broader liquidity creation measure that includes 
off-balance sheet activities. For small banks, the relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation is significant and negative with both definitions of the liquidity creation indicator. 
 
Our first liquidity measure is the narrow liquidity creation indicator (LC) defined by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) which only considers on-balance sheet positions. To compute 
this indicator, first, all assets and liabilities are classified as liquid, semiliquid or illiquid 
according to their maturity and their category. The authors assume that some assets are easier 
to sell than others (e.g., securitizable loans, trading assets). In addition, they assume that some 
liabilities can be more quickly withdrawn without penalty. Second, each asset and liability 
item is weighted accordingly. Table 3 shows the weights applied to bank balance sheets based 
on Berger and Bouwman (2009).  
                                                 
14 We use the inverse of the Basel III net stable funding ratio. A higher value indicates higher illiquidity. 
15 The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision also introduced the “liquidity coverage ratio”. 
This ratio is intended to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity profile of banks by ensuring that they 
have sufficient high-quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. This paper 
focuses on a one-year horizon and we do not compute such a ratio which requires the use of monthly data. 
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[Insert Table 3] 
 
Liquidity creation (LC) is then calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
All else being equal, a bank creates one dollar of liquidity by investing one dollar of 
liquid liabilities (e.g., transaction deposits) into one dollar of illiquid assets (e.g., business 
loans). Similarly, a bank destroys one dollar of liquidity by investing one dollar of illiquid 
liabilities or equity into one dollar of liquid assets (e.g., short-term government securities). 
Higher values of liquidity creation indicate higher bank illiquidity, as the bank invests more 
liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. In such a case, the bank is more exposed to maturity 
transformation risk if customers claim their funds on demand while illiquid assets are saleable 
at fire sale prices. 
 
Our second liquidity proxy is based on the regulatory standards proposed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision (BIS, 2009). Following the subprime 
crisis, in recognition of the need for banks to improve their liquidity management, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision developed an international framework for 
liquidity assessment in banking (BIS, 2009). Among the several guidelines, the Basel III 
accords include the implementation of the “net stable funding ratio”. This ratio is intended to 
promote resiliency over long-term time horizons by creating additional incentives for banks to 
fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis. This 
liquidity measure is the ratio of the available amount of stable funding to the required amount 
of stable funding. The available amount of stable funding is the total amount of an 
institution’s (1) capital, (2) liabilities with effective maturities of one year or greater, and (3) 
portion of “stable” demand deposits (i.e., funds with maturities of less than one year that 
would be expected to "stay" within the institution) and of term deposits with maturities of less 
than one year that would be expected to "stay" within the institution. The required amount of 
stable funding is the amount of a particular asset that could not be monetized through sale or 
used as collateral in a secured borrowing on an extended basis during a liquidity event lasting 
one year. To calculate the “net stable funding ratio”, a specific required stable funding factor 
    0.5 * illiquid assets + 0 * semiliquid assets - 0.5 * liquid assets 
 + 0.5 * liquid liabilities + 0 * semiliquid liabilities - 0.5 * illiquid liabilities
Total assets
LC = 
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is assigned to each particular type of asset and a specific available stable funding factor is 
assigned to each particular type of liability. In Table 4, we briefly summarize the composition 
of asset and liability categories and related stable funding factors. The higher the required 
amount of stable funding compared with the available amount of stable funding, the more 
illiquid a bank is considered. Because the regulation on bank liquidity is not yet implemented, 
this ratio is only an indicator of bank illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords and does 
not establish a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity 
characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one-year time horizon. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
For consistency with our first liquidity measure, we consider for this second liquidity 
measure the inverse of the regulatory ratio (BIS, 2009). Higher values of both measures will 
indicate higher illiquidity. The inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) is the ratio of 
the required amount of stable funding to the available amount of stable funding. In Table A.1 
(Appendix A), we show the breakdown of bank balance sheets as provided by Bloomberg and 
its weighting with respect to the Basel III framework to calculate the inverse of the net stable 
funding ratio. On the asset side, we define the type and maturity of assets consistent with the 
definition of BIS (2009) to apply the corresponding weights. On the liability side, we consider 
only the maturity of liabilities to apply the corresponding weights. Because the data only 
provide the breakdown of deposits according to their maturity and not according to the type of 
depositors, we consider the intermediate weight of 0.716 for stable demand deposits and 
saving deposits (including all deposits with a maturity of less than one year). We calculate the 
inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Basel Committee considers three different weights (i.e., 0.5 or 0.7 or 0.85) for demand and saving 
deposits (i.e., all deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year) according to the type of depositors. Here, it is the 
intermediate weight of 0.7 that is used. In section 6, we perform robustness checks by considering other weights. 
    0 * (cash + interbank assets + short-term marketable assets)
 + 0.5 * (long-term marketable assets + customer acceptances)
 + 0.85 * consumer loans
Required amount of stable funding  + 1 * (commercial loans + other loans + other assets + fixed assets)
Available amount of stable funding     0.7 * (demand deposits + saving deposits)
 + 0 * (short-term market debt + other short-term liabilities)
 + 1 * (long-term liabilities + equity)
=I_NSFR = 
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As mentioned above, higher values of the two liquidity indicators indicate higher bank 
illiquidity. Higher levels of liquidity creation (LC) mean that banks invest more liquid 
liabilities in illiquid assets. In addition, a higher inverse net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) 
implies that the amount of assets that cannot be monetized is deviating from the available 
amount of stable funding. In this context, a bank faces risk if some liquid liabilities (i.e., 
unstable funding) invested in illiquid assets (i.e., assets that could not be monetized or that 
can be sold at loss) are claimed on demand. In our approach, we hypothesize that the rational 
behavior of banks is to hold more capital to assume the losses incurred by higher illiquidity. 
Consequently, we expect a positive sign for the coefficients of the variables LC and I_NSFR 
in the determination of regulatory capital ratios. 
 
4.3. Variables affecting regulatory capital buffer and liquidity from previous literature 
 
Following the existing literature, we consider a large set of bank-level indicators and 
macroeconomic variables that are likely to affect bank regulatory capital ratios and liquidity 
respectively. 
 
4.3.1. Regulatory capital equation 
 
We include profitability in the regulatory capital equation. Because raising additional 
capital is costly, capital accumulation can more easily rely on funds generated internally 
(through higher retained earnings, weaker dividend payments and stock repurchase) in line 
with the “pecking order theory of finance” (Flannery and Rangan, 2008). Thus, we expect a 
positive relationship between bank profitability and regulatory capital ratios. We consider the 
return on equity as a proxy of bank profitability (ROE).  
Because capital accumulation will also depend on dividend policy and following 
Gropp and Heider (2010), we use the dividend payout ratio in the framework. We conjecture a 
negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio and regulatory capital ratios. The 
dividend payout ratio, as defined in the Bloomberg database, is the ratio of total common 
dividends to the difference between net income and minority interests plus preferred 
dividends (DIV_PYRT).  
We include the riskiness of bank assets in the regulatory capital equation. We consider 
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP_TLO) as a proxy of asset risk. Note that 
the expected sign for the relationship between this variable and regulatory capital ratios is not 
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clear-cut. Because bank capital can be viewed as a security buffer to assume losses from risky 
and poor quality assets, banks willing to take higher risk might hold more capital (Berger et 
al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Nier and Baumann, 2006). However, an increase in 
this ex post measure of risk could lower the regulatory capital ratio, given that capital is 
accumulated to face unexpected losses (Ayuso et al., 2004; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010). On 
the whole, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous. 
Nier and Baumann (2006) indicate that the funding structure of the bank is likely to 
affect capital buffer. Because uninsured debtholders are likely to face large losses in case of 
bank failure, they are particularly sensitive to the riskiness of the bank and to its default 
probability. From this perspective, uninsured debtholders will feel unsafe when the bank is 
operating with a capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum requirement and will increase 
their monitoring effort. Following the literature, subordinated debtholders are expected to 
have the strongest incentives to monitor and discipline banks. To avoid higher funding cost, 
banks that are more reliant on subordinated debt will hold higher levels of capital. Therefore, 
we use the ratio of subordinated debts to total debts (MKT_DISC) to capture such a behavior. 
We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of regulatory 
capital ratios17. 
Because a bank with a higher charter value can more easily raise capital on the market, 
it will presumably need to hold less capital. Alternatively, as argued by Gropp and Heider 
(2010), bank reputation and charter value should also be protected with a large amount of 
capital. We use the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets (MKT_BK_VAL) as a 
proxy of bank charter value. Thus, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable in the 
regulatory capital equation is ambiguous. 
We also include bank size in the regulatory capital equation. Large banks benefit from 
economies of scale in screening and monitoring borrowers and from greater diversification. In 
addition, because of their “too-big-to-fail” position, large banks might hold less capital in 
excess of regulatory requirements. Hence, a negative relationship is expected between bank 
size and regulatory capital ratios. We use the natural logarithm of total assets (LN_TA) as a 
proxy of bank size. We expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable in the 
determination of regulatory capital ratios. 
                                                 
17 This variable is only included in the equation with the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets as the 
dependent variable. It is not included when the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital to risk weighted assets because a portion of subordinated debt is eligible for Tier 2 capital. For 
robustness, we also introduce it when the dependent variable includes both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Our 
findings are unaltered. Results are shown in Table C.1 in Appendix. 
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We further consider an indicator of regulatory oversight of bank capital (CAP_REG) 
in the regulatory capital equation (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Shehzad et al., 2010). Because 
banking regulation is likely to vary across countries, this variable controls for possible 
country effects. This index is computed from the World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and 
Supervisory Database (Barth et al., 2007). Higher values of the bank capital regulation index18 
reflect stronger regulatory oversight. We expect that under strong regulation, banks are 
encouraged to maintain high levels of capital and increase their regulatory capital ratios. Thus, 
we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of regulatory 
capital ratios.  
We include the influence of the business cycle in the determination of regulatory 
capital ratios. According to previous studies (Ayuso et al., 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; 
Lindquist, 2004), capital buffer and economic activity tend to be negatively related. Banks 
tend to decrease their capital buffer during economic booms and increase it during economic 
downturns. However, Berger et al. (1995) argue that banks with external growth strategies 
might increase their capital buffer during economic booms to exploit acquisition 
opportunities. We consider the annual growth rate of real GDP (GDP_GWT) as a proxy of the 
economic environment. The expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous in 
the determination of regulatory capital ratios. 
 
4.3.2. Liquidity equation 
 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) shed light on the importance of bank market power in 
the ability to create liquidity. Market power can affect the availability of funds (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995) and the distribution of the loan portfolio (Berger et al. 2005). Greater market 
power might enable banks to enhance their transformation activities by granting more loans 
and attracting more funds (i.e., deposits or market funding). Thus, market power is expected 
to positively affect liquidity creation and hence bank illiquidity. We consider the ratio of total 
assets of bank i located in country j to the total assets of the banking system in country j 
                                                 
18 This index is the total number of affirmative answers to the following questions: (1) Is the minimum capital 
ratio requirement in line with the Basel guidelines? (2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market 
risk? (3) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of credit risk? (4) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function 
of operational risk? (5) Is there a simple leverage ratio required? (6) Are market values of loan losses not 
realized in accounting books deducted from capital? (7) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? 
(8) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? (9) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with 
International Accounting Standards? For each country in the sample, the possible changes in the answers to these 
questions over the 2000–2006 period were considered. Thus, for a given country, the value of the index might 
vary over time. 
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(MKT_POW) a proxy of bank market power. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of 
this variable in the determination of bank illiquidity19. 
Rauch et al. (2009a, 2009b) indicate the importance of monetary policy in the 
explanation of bank liquidity. When the central bank's policy rate is relatively low, credit 
supply increases, which positively affects bank illiquidity. In this study, we consider each 
country's central bank policy rate (CB) a proxy of monetary policy. We expect a negative sign 
for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of bank illiquidity. 
We also consider the impact of liquidity pressures on the interbank market. We use the 
spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rate of the central bank 
(IBK1M_CB) as a proxy of the liquidity pressures on the interbank market. Higher values of 
the spread reflect higher pressures on the interbank market, which make it more difficult for 
banks to access these sources of liquidity and, all else being equal, will therefore increase 
their liquidity risk (i.e., they might be unable to raise external funds). Consequently, we 
expect that higher values of the spread might negatively affect liquidity creation and bank 
illiquidity.  
The macroeconomic environment is also likely to affect bank activities and investment 
decisions (Chen et al., 2010; Pana et al., 2010). For example, the demand for differentiated 
financial products is higher during economic booms and might improve banks' ability to 
expand their loan and securities portfolios at a higher rate. Similarly, economic downturns are 
exacerbated by the reduction in bank credit supply. We hence conjecture that banks might 
increase their maturity transformation activities and thus their illiquidity during economic 
booms. We use the annual growth rate of real GDP (GDP_GWT) as a proxy of the economic 
environment. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination 
of bank illiquidity. 
 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables. 
 
                                                 
19 Bank size might also be a determinant of bank liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Rauch et al., 
2009). Large banks could create more liquidity than smaller banks because they have easier access to the lender 
of last resort and because they would be the first to benefit from the safety net. Therefore a positive relationship 
could be expected between bank size and illiquidity. We do not introduce this variable in the liquidity equation 
because it is highly correlated with our proxy of bank market power (MKT_POW). In section 6, we perform 
three robustness checks. First, we orthogonalize our proxy of bank market power with our proxy of bank size. 
We introduce our proxy of bank size and the residual component of our proxy of bank market power. Second, we 
orthogonalize our proxy of bank size with our proxy of bank market power. We introduce our proxy of bank 
market power and the residual component of our proxy of bank size. Third, we replace our proxy of bank market 
power by our proxy of bank size. Our main results remain identical. 
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[Insert Table 5] 
 
5. Results 
 
To test the impact of liquidity on bank regulatory capital beyond the determinants 
identified in the previous literature, we estimate a simultaneous equations system (system 
(1)). In the regulatory capital equation, we regress the bank regulatory capital ratio on a set of 
determinants from previous literature and on a proxy of liquidity. We use alternately two 
definitions of the regulatory capital ratio: the Tier 1 and 2 capital to risk weighted assets 
(T12_RWA) and the Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). The aim is to examine 
whether the results remain the same when considering the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio rather 
than the Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital ratio as banks might be managing the various 
components of regulatory capital differently. In the liquidity equation, we regress the proxy of 
liquidity on a set of determinants outlined in the previous literature. As proxies of liquidity, 
we use two indicators defined previously: the liquidity creation indicator (LC, in systems (1.a) 
and (1.a)) and the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR, in systems (1.b) and 
(1.b)). Table B. 1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B show the correlation coefficients among the 
explanatory variables in both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations. In addition, in 
both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, the presumably endogenous bank-level 
indicators are replaced by their one-year lagged value20.  
 
5.1. The relationship between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios 
 
Table 6 shows the regression results. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
The illiquidity variables LC and I_NSFR have a significant and negative impact only 
on T12_RWA as the dependent variable. Banks tend to decrease their Tier 1 and 2 capital ratio 
when they face higher illiquidity. In contrast, they do not adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio. 
                                                 
20 Previous empirical studies on capital buffer and liquidity highlight potential endogeneity with bank-level 
indicators. After testing for endogeneity (Hausman test), which confirms the presence of endogeneity and 
consistently with these studies, in both the regulatory capital and liquidity equations, we replace all bank-level 
explanatory variables by their one-year lagged value  because they are presumably endogenous. Regarding our 
two variables of interest (i.e. capital and liquidity), which are not lagged, we address endogeneity by estimating a 
simultaneous GMM equation system. 
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These results show that banks do not strengthen their solvency standards when they face 
higher illiquidity. The unexpected negative signs for our liquidity proxies might be explained 
as follows. Bank managers might consider certain liquid liabilities as stable and thus might be 
substituting stable liabilities to capital when facing higher illiquidity. 
Regarding the other determinants of regulatory capital ratios and of liquidity, most of 
the findings are consistent with those obtained in previous studies. The most relevant factors 
to explain bank regulatory capital ratios are profitability (ROE), the riskiness of bank assets 
(LLP_TLO) and the dividend payout ratio (DIV_PYRT). Thus, as hypothesized by Flannery 
and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010), more profitable banks or banks that 
distribute lower dividends tend to hold higher capital buffers, because they benefit from a 
better ability to accumulate capital from funds generated internally. In addition, consistent 
with Nier and Baumann (2006), banks increase their capital ratios when they face higher 
credit risk.  
Focusing on the determinants of liquidity, regulatory capital ratios (T12_RWA and 
T1_RWA) and the spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rate of the 
central bank (IBK1M_CB) are the most relevant factors. Consistently with the “financial 
fragility structure” (Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001) and the “crowding-out of deposits” 
(Gorton and Winton, 2000) theories, higher regulatory capital ratios are associated with lower 
liquidity creation and illiquidity. According to the “financial fragility structure” theory, this 
result might indicate that banks benefit from their informational advantage, which creates an 
agency problem. Banks are likely to extort rents from depositors. Consequently, banks must 
win depositors’ confidence by adopting a fragile financial structure with a large share of 
liquid deposits. Financial fragility favors liquidity creation because it allows banks to collect 
more deposits and grant more loans. In addition, from the “crowding-out of deposits” theory, 
higher capital ratios shift investors’ funds from relatively liquid deposits to relatively illiquid 
bank capital. Thus, the higher are banks’ capital ratios, the lower is their liquidity creation. In 
addition, perhaps surprisingly, the current findings highlight that an increase in the spread 
between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rate of the central bank is associated 
with higher illiquidity. Consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2012), our results also indicate 
that monetary policy (CB) is not a relevant factor to explain bank liquidity21. 
                                                 
21 Berger and Bouwman (2012) show that during normal times, monetary policy does not seem to have a 
significant effect on total liquidity creation by medium and large banks and that, for small banks, even if a 
loosening of monetary policy is associated with an increase in liquidity creation, this effect is economically 
small. 
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In summary, the results show that banks do not strengthen their solvency standards 
when they face higher illiquidity. They do not adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio and they 
actually decrease their Tier 1 and 2 capital ratio when they face higher illiquidity. 
Nevertheless, the definition of our liquidity measures can be adjusted in the U.S. case. Indeed, 
Harvey and Spong (2001) and Saunders and Cornett (2006) emphasize the importance of core 
deposits for U.S. banks. Core deposits are defined as the sum of demand deposits, saving 
deposits and time deposits lower than US$100,000. These deposits are to a great extent 
derived from a bank’s regular customer base and are therefore typically the most stable and 
least costly source of funding for banks (Harvey and Spong, 2001). Thus, it might be relevant 
to adopt an alternative definition for stable deposits by considering core deposits for U.S. 
banks. Consequently, we compute an alternative liquidity proxy by modifying the 
denominator of the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR). More precisely, we 
consider the sum of core deposits and other stable funding as a proxy of the available amount 
of stable funding22. This liquidity proxy is defined as the CFR variable. It is computed as 
follows for U.S. banks: 
 
 
 
5.2. The impact of liquidity on regulatory capital ratios separately for European and 
U.S. banks: The importance of core deposits for U.S. banks 
 
To delve deeper into the relationship between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios, 
we run regressions separately for European and U.S. banks by also considering the CFR 
variable for U.S. banks. Table 7 and Table 8 show the regression results. The CFR variable is 
included in systems (1.c) and (1.c) in Table 8. In system (1.c), the K_RWA variable is the Tier 
1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA). In systems (1.c), the K_RWA 
variable is the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). 
 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8] 
                                                 
22 The average share of core deposits to total deposits over the 2000–2006 period is 79% for the U.S. banks 
included in the sample. However, there is a high heterogeneity: the standard deviation of this ratio is 13.5%. 
    0 * (cash + interbank assets + short-term marketable assets)
 + 0.5 * (long-term marketable assets + customer acceptances)
 + 0.85 * consumer loans
Required amount of stable funding  + 1 * (commercial loans + other loans + other assets + fixed assets)
Core deposits + Stable funding     1 * core deposits
 + 0 * (short-term market debt + other short-term liabilities)
 + 1 * (long-term liabilities + equity)
=
CFR = 
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Regarding European banks, while the coefficient of I_NSFR is significantly negative 
only when the total regulatory capital ratio is the dependent variable, the coefficient of LC is 
significantly negative for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios as the dependent 
variables. These results emphasize that, instead of strengthening their solvency standards, 
European banks reduce their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity. 
Focusing on U.S. banks, for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios, all the 
coefficients of the proxies of liquidity are significantly negative. These results show that, 
similarly to European banks, U.S. banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they 
face higher illiquidity even when considering a measure of bank liquidity that focuses more 
closely on core deposits.  
 
5.3. The impact of bank size and access to external funding on the relationship 
between liquidity and regulatory capital ratios  
 
By running separate regressions for U.S. and European banks, the results show that, 
regardless of their institutional environment, banks do not strengthen their regulatory capital 
ratios when they face higher illiquidity. However, depending on their size, the ability of banks 
to access external funding is presumably different. Large banks might benefit from a 
reputational advantage, possibly providing them a broader access to financial markets. This is 
likely to affect the causal link that goes from bank illiquidity to capital23. Furthermore, large 
and small banks might have different scope of activities and contrasting business models. 
Following the literature, a bank is considered small if its total assets are below US$1 
billion. In Table 224, the data show that small banks both in Europe and in the United States 
are on average more focused on traditional intermediation activities than large banks. Small 
banks hold significantly more average shares of loans and deposits in total assets than large 
banks. Therefore, we run regressions separately for large and small banks, still separating 
European and U.S. banks (Table 9)25. 
                                                 
23 Berger and Bouwman (2009) also argue that the “financial fragility structure”, the “deposit crowding-out” and 
the “risk absorption” effects might affect differently the causal link that goes from bank capital to liquidity 
creation depending on bank size. They expect that both the “financial fragility structure” and “deposit crowding-
out” effects are likely to be relatively strong for small banks. Indeed small banks deal more with entrepreneurial-
type small businesses, where the close monitoring highlighted in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) is important. 
In addition, small banks tend to be more funded by deposits, so that capital may “crowd out” deposits as in 
Gorton and Winton (2000). This effect is likely to be relatively weak for large banks that can more easily access 
market funding. 
24 See Section 3.1. 
25 Only the results obtained for the variables of interest are reported in Table 9. Detailed results are available 
upon request. 
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[Insert Table 9] 
 
In addition, following the subprime crisis, most regulatory authorities emphasize the 
importance of “systemically important financial institutions”. The Federal Reserve qualifies a 
bank as “significant” if it holds US$50 billion or more in total consolidated assets (FED, 
2011)26. Using this criterion, we run regressions separately for European and U.S. banks on 
two sub-samples of banks: the very large (i.e., “significant”) banks (total assets above US$50 
billion) and the other large banks (total assets below US$50 billion and above US$1 billion). 
Table 10 shows the regression results27. 
 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
Regarding European banks, for both large and small banks, banks do not strengthen 
their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity (Table 9). However, because 
the sample of European banks includes a relatively low number of small banks (i.e., only 37 
banks), the results for small European banks might not be as reliable as those for large banks. 
For large U.S. banks (Table 9), for both definitions of regulatory capital ratios, all the 
liquidity variables have a significantly negative effect on bank regulatory capital ratios28. By 
contrast, for small U.S. banks, the LC and I_NSFR variables are not significant to explain 
bank regulatory capital ratios. Besides, whereas the coefficient of CFR, a measure of liquidity 
that focuses more closely on core deposits, is significantly negative for large U.S. banks, it is 
significantly positive for small U.S. banks with both definitions of regulatory capital. Thus, 
small banks increase their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity, as 
measured by the CFR variable. These findings suggest that when small banks face higher 
                                                 
26 The term ‘significant is used in the credit exposure reporting provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which apply 
to bank holding companies and foreign banks that are treated as a bank holding company and that have US$50 
billion or more in assets (FED, 2011). 
27 Only the results obtained for the variables of interest are reported in Table 10. Detailed results are available 
upon request.  
28 Regarding the causal link that goes from bank capital to liquidity creation, our results, which are available 
upon request, show that this relationship is insignificant for large banks. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Berger and Bouwman (2009) based on a liquidity creation indicator ignoring off-balance sheet 
activities. However, they find a positive and significant relationship between capital and liquidity creation for 
large banks when they consider a liquidity creation measure that includes off-balance sheet activities. In contrast 
with Berger and Bouwman (2009), we do not find a significant and negative relationship between bank capital 
and liquidity creation for small banks. Our sample only includes listed banks and ignores a large number of small 
privately owned banks. The results are therefore not directly comparable but suggest that publicly traded banks 
which are more closely monitored by market participants behave differently than privately owned ones. 
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illiquidity, they increase their regulatory capital ratios, presumably to secure access to 
external sources of liquidity if necessary. 
 
Regarding our findings for very large banks, our sample includes 20 very large 
financial institutions and 197 other large banks in the United States (i.e., 3% and 34% of the 
sample of U.S. banks, respectively) and 56 very large financial institutions and 114 other 
large banks in Europe (i.e., 27% and 55% of the sample of European, respectively). For both 
U.S. and European very large banks (Table 10), there is no significant positive link between 
regulatory capital ratios and illiquidity. However, because the sample includes a relatively 
low number of very large banks, the results might not be as reliable as those for other large 
banks. When we consider U.S and European other large banks, for both definitions of 
regulatory capital ratios, all the liquidity variables have a significantly negative effect on bank 
regulatory capital ratios.  
On the whole, only small U.S. banks increase their regulatory capital ratios when 
facing higher illiquidity considering a measure of bank illiquidity that focuses more closely on 
core deposits. These findings suggest that bank managers might be rationally targeting a 
liquidity ratio different from the one proposed by Basel III to adjust their regulatory capital 
ratios. Presumably, large banking institutions might underestimate liquidity risk because of 
their too-big-to-fail position. If bank executives believe they can systematically have priority 
access to liquidity for safety net and systemic risk considerations, such institutions will not 
adjust their regulatory capital ratios accordingly. However, large institutions might also be 
managing liquidity differently, with more sophisticated off-balance sheet instruments. 
Because a detailed breakdown of off-balance sheets is not available in standard databases, we 
solely consider the liquidity profile of banks stemming from their on-balance sheet positions. 
Therefore, our liquidity measures will either underestimate or overestimate a bank's actual 
exposure to liquidity risk depending on the extent of its net off-balance sheet commitments 
(i.e., short or long net positions). This could alter our results for large banks because they are 
generally more involved in off-balance sheet activities, and specifically in sophisticated 
instruments, than small banks. If the actual exposure of large banks to liquidity risk is higher 
than the one captured through their on-balance sheet operations, the results would still be 
consistent. However, if their actual exposure is lower because they are using off-balance sheet 
instruments to hedge part of their liquidity risk, the results for large banks will merely indicate 
that such institutions manage their liquidity differently and not necessarily that they are taking 
advantage of their too-big-to-fail position. 
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6. Robustness checks 
 
We perform several robustness checks, still considering European and U.S. banks 
separately according to their size. We run regressions separately for 2 groups: large and small 
banks. Appendix C presents regression results29. 
 
6.1. Including banks with regulatory capital ratios below minimum requirements 
 
We further check the robustness of our results by including the banks with regulatory 
capital ratios below the minimum requirements. For European banks, the number of 
observations remains unchanged for the group of small banks but 13 observations are added 
for the group of large banks. For U.S. banks, 2 observations are added for the sub-sample of 
large banks and 4 observations for the sub-sample small banks. In all cases, the results are 
consistent with those previously obtained30. 
 
6.2. Considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer 
 
We further investigate the robustness of our results by considering bank regulatory 
capital buffer instead of bank regulatory capital ratios. We take in account that regulators set 
the minimum requirement at 8%, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United 
Kingdom where it is equal to 9% following Jokipii and Milne (2008)31. In addition, in 
Germany, regulatory minimum requirement is set to 12.5% for newly established banks in the 
first two years of business. However, such banks are not included in the sample of German 
banks. We perform this robustness check only for Europeans banks considering the Tier 1 and 
2 regulatory capital ratio. Indeed, as the minimum requirement for this regulatory capital ratio 
is set to 8% in the United States, considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer or the Tier 
1 and 2 risk weighted capital ratio leads to the same results. Similarly, as the minimum 
requirement for the Tier 1 risk weighted capital ratio is set to 4% in all countries, considering 
                                                 
29 In all the tables, we only report the results obtained for the variables of interest. Detailed results are available 
upon request.  
30 Results are available upon request. 
31 In the United Kingdom, the Financial Stability Authority considers two capital ratios: the trigger ratio and the 
higher target ratio. The trigger ratio corresponds to the regulatory minimum risk weighted capital ratio. The 
higher target ratio is set above the trigger ratio, resulting in higher levels of capital required by the regulators for 
individual banks. Jokipii and Milne (2008) consider a 9% requirement for UK banks. To deal with this issue and 
following Jokipii and Milne (2008), the regulatory minimum risk weighted capital ratio is set at 9% in this study 
for UK banks. 
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Tier 1 regulatory capital buffer or the Tier 1 risk weighted capital ratio leads to the same 
results. Regression results considering only European banks are shown in Table C.2. The 
results are consistent with those previously obtained with the Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital 
ratio. 
 
6.3. “True commercial banks” 
 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we also run our estimations on a sub-sample 
limited to “true commercial banks”. We impose the following restrictions. We exclude a bank 
if it is very small (with total assets below US$25 million) and if it has consumer loans 
exceeding 50% of total assets. Berger and Bouwman (2009) also delete a bank if it (1) has no 
loans outstanding; (2) has zero deposits; (3) has zero or negative equity capital. However, we 
have no such banks in our sample. Furthermore, they consider two other criteria and delete a 
bank if it has unused commitments exceeding four times of total assets and if it resembles a 
thrift (residential real estate loans exceeding 50% of total assets). Due to data limitation we do 
not consider these two additional criteria. For European banks, we delete 81 observations for 
large banks and 38 observations for small banks For U.S. banks, we delete 58 observations for 
large banks and 161 observations for small banks. In all cases, the main conclusions are 
consistent with those previously obtained on our full sample of banks (Table C.3). 
 
6.4. Introducing bank size in the liquidity equation 
 
Large banks could create more liquidity than small banks because they have easier 
access to the lender of last resort and because they would be the first to benefit from the safety 
net. Therefore a positive relationship could be expected between bank size and illiquidity. As 
an additional robustness check, we introduce a proxy of bank size in the liquidity equation. 
The natural logarithm of total assets (LN_TA) is considered as a proxy of bank size. As this 
variable is highly correlated with our proxy of bank market power (MKT_POW), we perform 
three robustness checks. First, we orthogonalise our proxy of bank market power with our 
proxy of bank size. We introduce our proxy of bank size and the residual component of our 
proxy of bank market power (Table C.4). Second, we orthogonalise our proxy of bank size 
with our proxy of bank market power. We introduce our proxy of bank market power and the 
residual component of our proxy of bank size (Table C.5). Third, we include our proxy of 
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bank size in the two equations and we delete our proxy of market power in the liquidity 
equation (Table C.6). In all cases, our results are consistent with those previously obtained. 
 
6.5. A measure of liquidity creation adjusted for equity 
 
The regression specification is inspired by the theories of bank liquidity creation. 
These theories argue that banks create liquidity when illiquid assets are transformed into 
liquid liabilities but not when they are transformed into illiquid claims such as equity. The 
theories also emphasize that equity might affect a bank’s ability to create liquidity. A potential 
concern about the regression specification is that current bank equity is included in both the 
liquidity creation indicator and the regulatory capital ratios. To address this issue, following 
Berger and Bouwman (2009), we compute an alternative liquidity creation measure by 
excluding equity LC_EE. This measure does not penalize banks for funding part of their 
activities with equity capital. As a result, the measured amount of liquidity creation is higher 
for all banks, and this increase is larger for banks holding more capital (Table C.7). On the 
whole, our main conclusions are consistent with those previously obtained with the LC 
variable. 
 
6.6. Alternative weights for stable deposits in the inverse of the net stable funding ratio 
 
To determine the robustness of the results for the I_NSFR variable, we change the 
weight of 0.7 for demand and saving deposits. We alternately consider three other weights to 
determine whether the results can be affected by the extent of deposits considered stable. The 
first weight, 0.5 (I_NSFR_D05), is the minimum weight set by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Regulation and Supervision for stable demand and saving deposits. The second, 0.85 
(I_NSFR_D085), is the maximum weight set by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation 
and Supervision for stable demand and saving deposits. The third, 1, is the extreme case 
considering all demand and saving deposits as stable. Explicit deposit insurance systems and 
implicit government guarantee of deposits mitigate the risk of run on deposits and strengthen 
their stability (I_NSFR_D1). Again, our main conclusions are consistent with those previously 
obtained with the I_NSFR variable (Table C.8). 
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6.7. Alternative liquidity proxies 
 
We further examine the robustness of our results by considering other definitions for 
liquidity proxies. First, we use an alternative specification of the liquidity creation indicator 
by computing the ratio of illiquid assets to illiquid liabilities (IA_IL) as defined by Berger and 
Bouwman (2009). Second, we use a liquidity proxy based on the “liquidity transformation 
gap” (also called LT Gap) as Deep and Schaefer (2004) suggest. The LT Gap is the difference 
between liquid liabilities and liquid assets held by a bank, scaled by its total assets. In their 
work, they deem all the assets and the liabilities that mature within one year liquid. Using this 
definition of illiquid assets and liabilities of Deep and Schaefer (2004), we compute the 
“liquidity transformation ratio” (also called “LT Ratio”, LTR) as the ratio of illiquid assets 
(i.e., total loans, long term marketable assets, other assets and net fixed assets) to illiquid 
liabilities (i.e., time deposits, long term market funding and equity). Finally, we use an 
alternative specification of the CFR variable based on the “financing gap” of Saunders and 
Cornett (2006). The “financing gap” is the difference between average loans and core 
deposits. Using this indicator, the core deposit ratio (CDR) is the ratio of total loans to total 
core deposits. As for the CFR variable, the core deposit ratio variable is only calculated for 
U.S. banks, as core deposits can only be identified for U.S. banks (Table C.9). On the whole, 
the results confirm the conclusions previously obtained. 
 
6.8. Alternative definitions of small U.S. banks 
 
Following the literature, a bank is considered small if its total assets are below US$1 
billion. This definition of small banks conforms in the U.S. to the usual notion of “community 
banks” that primarily create liquidity by transforming locally generated deposits into local 
loans on the balance sheet. However, all the banks considered in our study are listed on a 
stock exchange. Such institutions are very different and have unequal access to financial 
markets. Thus, as a robustness check, we consider other criteria to define small U.S. banks32. 
First, following FDIC (2012), we consider that while community banks are traditionally 
defined strictly in terms of their size, a more nuanced model should be chosen depending on 
the amount of loans and core deposits. Banks with total assets below US$1 billion should not 
                                                 
32 We do not apply these criteria in the European case because listed banks in Europe are on average larger. 
Thus, there is only 37 European banks in our sample with total assets below US$1 billion. Besides, the notion of 
“community bank” is specific to the U.S.. 
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be automatically included if they lack high loan levels and core funding. Thus, we include 
only banks with total assets below US$1 billion that have a ratio of total loans to total assets 
that exceeds 33% and a ratio of total core deposits to total assets that exceeds 50%33 (see 
FDIC (2012)). Our results are consistent with those previously obtained (Table C.10). Indeed, 
both the LC and I_NSFR variables are not significant to explain bank regulatory capital ratios 
whereas the CFR variable has a significantly positive effect on both regulatory capital ratios. 
Besides, the level of significance of the CFR variable is higher and the associated coefficient 
is twice the one obtained for banks with total assets below US$1 billion.  
Second, because our aim is to focus on banks with a restricted access to financial markets, we 
consider only the “very small banks” which are expected to have the most restricted access to 
financial markets. Following FDIC (2009), a bank is considered very small if its total assets is 
lower than US$500 million. Our results are consistent with those previously obtained (Table 
C.11). We still find that the CFR variable has a significantly positive effect on both regulatory 
capital ratios. In addition, the I_NSFR variable has also a significantly positive effect on the 
regulatory capital ratios. 
Third, we consider other criteria to define banks with limited access to financial markets. We 
only include in our sample of small U.S. banks, banks with total assets below US$ 1 billion 
which do not issue subordinated debt (null subordinated debt) and whose reliance on market 
funding is relatively low (ratio of market debts34 to total debt lower than the median 
calculated on the whole sample of U.S. banks (11.7%)) (Table C.12). We still find that the 
CFR variable has a significantly positive effect on both regulatory capital ratios. The level of 
significance of the CFR variable is higher and the associated coefficient is twice the one 
obtained for banks with total assets below US$1 billion. Besides, the I_NSFR variable has 
also a significantly positive effect on the regulatory capital ratios. Thus, small U.S. banks 
(with total assets below US$1 billion) with a limited reliance on financial markets improve 
their solvency more strongly than other small banks when they face higher illiquidity as 
defined in the Basel III accords. 
                                                 
33 These criteria are applied to large banks in FDIC (2012) to broaden the sample of community banks. In our 
case, we apply these criteria to small banks to ensure that they have a business model corresponding to 
community banks. 
34 Market debts correspond to short and long term borrowings, and subordinated debt. Short-term borrowings 
include bank overdrafts, short-term debts and borrowings, repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repos, 
short-term portion of long-term borrowings, current obligations under capital (finance) leases trust receipts, bills 
payable, bankers acceptances, and current portion of hire purchase creditors. Long-term borrowings include all 
interest-bearing financial obligations that are not current, convertible, redeemable, retractable debentures, bonds, 
loans, mortgage debts, sinking funds, long-term bank overdrafts and capital (finance) lease obligations. They 
exclude short-term portion of long term debt, pension obligations, deferred tax liabilities and preferred equity. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between bank regulatory capital 
buffer and liquidity. Building on previous studies indicating that capital and liquidity are 
presumably jointly determined, we consider a simultaneous equations model to investigate the 
impact of bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions on regulatory capital 
buffer beyond the determinants considered in the existing literature. Specifically, we question 
whether banks maintain or strengthen their regulatory capital buffer when they face lower 
liquidity because regulatory requirements regarding liquidity have not yet been implemented. 
The main results show that banks decrease their regulatory capital when they create 
more liquidity (i.e., when they fund larger portions of illiquid assets with liquid liabilities) or 
when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords. Nevertheless, the 
definition of stable funding might be adjusted in the U.S. case. By using an alternative 
indicator of liquidity that focuses more closely on core deposits for U.S. banks, the results 
show that small U.S. banks do actually strengthen their solvency standards when they face 
higher illiquidity.   
These findings support the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to 
capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision, but 
they also cast doubt on the accuracy of the current framework. Adding liquidity ratios to 
capital ratios might be more relevant for large banking institutions than for small banks. 
Presumably, large banking institutions might underestimate liquidity risk because of their too-
big-to-fail position. However, large institutions might also be managing liquidity differently, 
with more sophisticated off-balance sheet instruments.  
 Moreover, the definition and measurement of liquidity must be further clarified under 
a global regulatory framework. Regulators need to determine what type of liquid liabilities 
should be considered stable for a deeper regulatory definition of the notion of core or stable 
deposits. These findings also raise questions regarding the implementation of uniform 
liquidity requirements to all types of banks if large banking institutions either behave 
differently because of their too-big-to-fail position or are able to manage their liquidity 
differently. 
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Table 1. Distribution of U.S. and European publicly traded commercial banks 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg, European Central Bank, Bank of England, National Bank of Switzerland, Sveriges Riskbank, Danmarks 
Nationalbank, Central Bank of Iceland, FDIC and Finance Norway. To deal with the issue of sample representativeness, we 
compare aggregate total assets of banks included in the final sample (i.e., U.S. and European publicly traded commercial 
banks) with aggregate total assets of the whole banking system. From 2000 to 2006, we compute the ratio of aggregate total 
assets of banks included in the final sample to aggregate total assets of the whole banking system. This table reports the 
average value of this ratio country by country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks 
available in 
Bloomberg
Banks included in 
our final sample
Total assets of banks in final 
sample / total assets of the 
banking system (%)
United States 645 574 66.4
Europe 225 207 60.4
Austria 8 8 57.3
Belgium 4 3 80.3
Cyprus 4 4 69.7
Denmark 44 38 60.6
Finland 2 2 71.2
France 22 22 62.1
Germany 15 14 40.1
Greece 12 12 80.6
Iceland 2 2 66.3
Ireland 3 3 31.3
Italy 24 22 59.6
Liechtenstein 2 2 50.1
Malta 4 4 32.5
Netherlands 2 2 47.6
Norway 23 20 70.3
Portugal 6 6 55.3
Spain 15 15 64.4
Sweden 4 4 72.6
Switzerland 22 18 74.8
United Kingdom 7 6 61.5
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Table 2. Summary descriptive statistics of the sample of U.S. and European listed 
commercial banks, on average, from 2000 to 2006 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2000–2006). All variables are expressed in percentage, except Total assets. Total assets in US$ billion; 
Total loans / total assets: (commercial loans + consumer loans + other loans) / total assets; Total deposits / total assets: 
(demand deposits + saving deposits + time deposits + other time deposits) / total assets; Loan loss provisions / total loans: 
loan loss provisions / (commercial loans + consumer loans + other loans); Tier 1 capital / total assets: Tier 1 capital / total 
assets; Tier 1 and 2 capital / RWA: (Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) / total risk weighted assets; ROA: net income / total assets; 
Total interest income / total income: (interest income from loans + resale agreements + interbank investments + other interest 
income or losses) / total income. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. T-statistics test for null 
hypothesis of identical means for large and small European (respectively, U.S. banks). *, ** *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, for bilateral test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total assets in 
US$ billion
Total loans / 
total assets
Total deposits / 
total assets
Loan loss 
provisions / 
total loans
Tier 1 capital / 
total assets
Tier 1 and 2 
capital / RWA
ROA
Total interest 
income / total 
income
 Mean 42.5 65.4 70.7 0.4 8.4 13.4 0.9 72.0
 Median 1.0 67.2 76.1 0.3 7.9 12.6 1.0 75.6
 Max 2176.5 95.1 93.9 6.7 35.2 34.0 6.9 100.0
 Min 0.02 4.8 4.1 -1.2 2.1 8.0 -13.3 4.7
 Std. Dev. 180.0 14.2 17.0 0.5 3.3 3.3 0.9 15.6
 Mean 34.9 63.5 73.9 0.4 8.0 13.2 1.1 72.8
 Median 2.8 65.5 75.4 0.3 7.5 12.5 1.2 74.9
 Max 1962.5 93.2 92.1 4.7 28.5 30.1 5.7 99.5
 Min 1.00 4.8 28.0 -0.6 0.1 5.1 -13.3 16.6
 Std. Dev. 157.3 12.5 9.8 0.4 2.6 2.8 0.8 13.1
 Mean 0.5 67.6 90.7 0.3 9.3 14.2 0.9 79.9
 Median 0.4 68.8 92.1 0.3 8.7 13.2 1.0 81.5
 Max 1.0 93.0 100.0 5.9 59.9 36.0 6.9 98.9
 Min 0.0 6.9 52.7 -0.7 2.5 8.2 -13.3 20.6
 Std. Dev. 0.2 11.4 7.1 0.4 3.8 3.6 0.9 10.3
Test statistic & 
%level
 -10.12 ***
(0.00)
 10.27 ***
(0.00)
22.30 ***
(0.00)
 -1.23 ***
(0.00)
 14.07 ***
(0.00)
7.84 ***
(0.00)
 -9.64 ***
(0.00)
 18.15 ***
(0.00)
 Mean 145.2 63.2 47.6 0.5 6.6 11.5 0.7 56.4
 Median 14.6 65.4 48.1 0.4 6.0 11.3 0.7 58.4
 Max 2176.5 95.1 93.6 6.7 26.0 25.9 3.8 97.1
 Min 1.01 6.4 4.1 -0.7 0.9 5.1 -5.5 4.7
 Std. Dev. 315.4 19.3 17.7 0.6 3.2 1.9 0.6 15.5
 Mean 0.4 67.9 69.1 0.8 11.5 14.6 1.3 67.6
 Median 0.4 67.8 70.3 0.6 11.9 13.7 1.2 70.4
 Max 1.0 93.0 89.9 4.4 23.1 30.2 4.1 98.4
 Min 0.0 6.3 26.5 -1.2 4.2 9.2 -4.4 9.5
 Std. Dev. 0.3 16.0 10.8 0.8 4.0 3.6 0.9 14.4
Test statistic & 
%level
 -7.52 ***
(0.00)
3.74 ***
(0.00)
19.07 ***
(0.00)
5.99 ***
(0.00)
20.87 ***
(0.00)
17.33 ***
(0.00)
11.28 ***
(0.00)
10.71 ***
(0.00)
Small European banks
All banks
Large U.S. banks
Small U.S. banks
Large European banks
 37
Table 3. Balance sheets weighting used to calculate the liquidity creation indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assets Liquidity level Weights
Cash and near cash items Liquid -0.5
Interbank assets Semiliquid 0
Short-term marketable assets Liquid -0.5
Commercial loans Illiquid 0.5
Consumer loans Semiliquid 0
Other loans Semiliquid 0
Long-term marketable assets Semiliquid 0
Fixed assets Illiquid 0.5
Other assets Illiquid 0.5
Custumer acceptances Semiliquid 0
Liabilities
Demand deposits Liquid 0.5
Saving deposits Liquid 0.5
Time deposits Semiliquid 0
Other term deposits Semiliquid 0
Short-term borrowings Liquid 0.5
Other short-term liabilities Liquid 0.5
Long-term borrowings Semiliquid 0
Other long-term liabilities Semiliquid 0
Subordinated debentures Illiquid -0.5
Prefered equity Illiquid -0.5
Minority interests Illiquid -0.5
Shareholder common capital Illiquid -0.5
Retained earnings Illiquid -0.5
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Table 4. Balance sheets weighting used to calculate the inverse of the net stable funding 
ratio 
 
 
Source: BIS (2009). The inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) is the ratio of the required amount of stable funding 
to the available amount of stable funding. It is based on the net stable funding ratio as defined in the Basel III accords. For 
further details about the weighting of bank balance sheet items to compute this ratio, see appendix A. 
Assets Corresponding definition of BIS Weights
Cash and near cash items Cash 0
Interbank assets
Nonrenewable loans to financials 
with remaining maturity < 1 yr
0
Marketable securities and other 
short-term investments
Short-term unsecured actively traded 
instruments (with remaining maturity 
< 1 yr)
0
Commercial loans All other assets 1
Consumer loans
Loans to retail clients (with 
remaining maturity < 1 yr)
0.85
Other loans All other assets 1
Long-term investments
Unemcumbered listed equity or 
nonfinancial senior unsecured 
corporate bonds rated at least A- 
(with remaining maturity > 1 yr)
0.5
Fixed assets All other assets 1
Other assets All other assets 1
Customer acceptances 
Unemcumbered listed equity or 
nonfinancial senior unsecured 
corporate bonds rated at least A- 
(with remaining maturity > 1 yr)
0.5
Liabilities Corresponding definition of BIS Weights
Demand deposits 0.7
Saving deposits 0.7
Time deposits
Other liabilities with an effective 
maturity > 1 yr
1
Other term deposits
Other liabilities with an effective 
maturity > 1 yr
1
Short-term borrowings
All other liabilities or equity not 
included above
0
Other short-term liabilities
All other liabilities or equity not 
included above
0
Long-term borrowings
Other liabilities with an effective 
maturity > 1 yr
1
Other long-term liabilities
Other liabilities with an effective 
maturity > 1 yr
1
Subordinated debentures 1
Prefered equity 1
Minority interests 1
Shareholder common capital 1
Retained earnings 1
Deposits of retail and small business 
customers (nonmaturity or residual 
maturity < 1yr)
Tier 1 and 2 capital instruments, other 
preferred shares and capital 
instruments in excess of Tier 2 
allowable amount having an effective 
maturity > 1 yr
Required amount of stable funding
Available amount of stable funding
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables for U.S. and European listed 
commercial banks, on average from 2000 to 2006 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2000–2006), World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and Supervisory Database. All variables are expressed in 
percentage, except LN_TA, MKT_BK_VAL and CAP_REG. LC: liquidity creation / total assets; I_NSFR: required amount of 
stable funding / available amount of stable funding; ROE: net income / total equity; LLP_TLO loan loss provisions / total 
loans; MKT_DISC: subordinated debt / total debt; DIV_PYRT: common dividend / (net income – minority interests – 
preferred dividends); MKT_BK_VAL: market value of assets/ book value of assets; LN_TA: natural logarithm of total assets; 
GDP_GWT: annual growth rate of real GDP; CAP_REG: index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; T12_RWA: Tier 1 
and 2 capital / total risk weighted assets; T1_RWA: Tier 1 capital / total risk weighted assets; MKT_POW: total assets of bank 
i in country j / total assets of the banking system in country j; CB: central bank policy rate; IBK1M_CB: spread of 1 month 
interbank rate and central bank policy rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std Dev Obs
LC 31.1 31.4 72.9 -25.3 12.7 4926
I_NSFR 90.2 89.3 312.4 20.5 21.2 4926
ROE 11.7 12.1 47.9 -88.1 7.6 4943
LLP_TLO 0.4 0.3 6.7 -1.2 0.5 4873
MKT_DISC 0.7 0.0 18.5 0.0 1.4 4926
DIV_PYRT 31.1 31.7 100.0 0.0 22.4 4770
MKT_BK_VAL 1.8 1.7 7.7 0.0 0.8 4776
LN_TA 7.6 7.0 14.6 2.8 2.1 4926
GDP_GWT 2.6 2.7 9.5 -1.6 1.1 5467
CAP_REG 5.8 6.0 8.0 2.0 0.9 5467
T12_RWA 13.5 12.7 36.0 5.1 3.4 4637
T1_RWA 11.8 11.1 35.2 3.3 3.7 4637
MKT_POW 1.7 0.0 74.5 0.0 6.3 4926
CB 3.1 2.3 15.3 0.3 1.9 5467
IBK1M_CB 0.1 0.1 3.5 -0.4 0.2 5467
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Table 6. Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of U.S. and European publicly 
traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk 
weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a) and (1.b)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems 
(1.a) and (1.b)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)) or the inverse 
of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher 
bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in 
the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity 
equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by 
their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
1. a 1. b 1. a' 1. b'
Regulatory capital equation
LC 
-0.03 **
(-2.25)
 - 
-0.003
(-0.24)
 - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.02 **
(-2.07)
 - 
-0.003
(-0.37)
ROE
0.01
(1.20)
0.01
(1.35)
0.02 **
(1.99)
0.02 *
(1.77)
LLP_TLO
0.37 ***
(4.04)
0.42 ***
(4.34)
0.43 ***
(4.24)
0.45 ***
(4.40)
MKT_DISC  -  - 
0.04
(1.53)
0.05 *
(1.69)
DIV_PYRT
-0.01 ***
(-2.45)
-0.01 ***
(-2.84)
-0.01 ***
(-3.86)
-0.01 ***
(-3.98)
MKT_BK_VAL 
-0.001
(-0.78)
-0.001
(-1.13)
0.005
(0.68)
0.004
(0.57)
LN_TA
0.005 ***
(2.94)
0.003 **
(1.94)
0.002
(1.29)
0.002
(1.20)
GDP_GWT 
-0.02
(-0.48)
-0.03
(-0.67)
-0.04
(-0.87)
-0.02
(-0.55)
CAP_REG 
-0.01
(-0.15)
-0.01
(-0.19)
0.01
(0.16)
0.003
(0.06)
Liquidity equation
K_RWA
-1.90 ***
(-2.78)
-3.45 ***
(-3.16)
-0.91 *
(-1.73)
-2.46 ***
(-2.85)
MKT_POW
-0.08
(-0.39)
-0.18
(-0.36)
-0.25
(-1.15)
-0.61
(-1.12)
GDP_GWT 
0.69 ***
(3.31)
0.15
(0.33)
0.81 ***
(4.14)
0.35
(0.82)
CB 
-0.63
(-0.41)
1.04
(0.38)
-0.58
(-0.33)
1.60
(0.55)
IBK1M_CB 
1.86 ***
(14.38)
2.98 ***
(11.40)
2.02 ***
(19.23)
3.13 ***
(13.30)
Total Obs. 3644 3644 3644 3644
Tier 1 & 2
 regulatory capital ratio
Tier 1
 regulatory capital ratio
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Table 7. Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios for European banks 
 
  
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of European publicly traded 
commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted 
assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a) and (1.b)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a) and 
(1.b)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)) or the inverse of the net 
stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank 
illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the 
regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, 
all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year 
lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
1. a 1. b 1. a' 1. b'
Regulatory capital equation
LC 
-0.15 ***
(-2.69)
 - 
-0.09 **
(-2.04)
 - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.05 **
(-2.31)
 - 
-0.02
(-1.19)
ROE
0.01
(0.81)
0.003
(0.25)
0.01
(1.01)
0.01
(0.85)
LLP_TLO
0.18
(0.83)
0.13
(0.63)
0.26
(1.35)
0.37 **
(2.17)
MKT_DISC  -  - 
0.01
(0.27)
0.01
(0.34)
DIV_PYRT
0.002
(0.74)
0.003
(0.86)
-0.003
(-1.02)
-0.003
(-1.33)
MKT_BK_VAL 
0.001
(0.24)
0.001
(0.59)
-0.002
(-1.46)
-0.003
(-1.41)
LN_TA
-0.01
(-1.29)
-0.01
(-1.25)
-0.002
(-0.45)
-0.001
(-0.20)
GDP_GWT 
0.21 ***
(2.70)
0.10
(1.47)
0.24 ***
(3.58)
0.17 ***
(2.91)
CAP_REG 
0.002
(0.13)
0.000
(0.02)
-0.001
(-0.08)
-0.004
(-0.26)
Liquidity equation
K_RWA
0.21
(0.16)
-3.13
(-1.10)
-2.70 ***
(-2.87)
-9.35 ***
(-4.32)
MKT_POW
-0.24 *
(-1.64)
-0.69 *
(-1.78)
-0.14
(-0.82)
-0.77 *
(-1.82)
GDP_GWT 
1.21 ***
(4.24)
1.48 **
(2.20)
1.45 ***
(4.79)
2.28 ***
(3.09)
CB 
-0.75
(-0.44)
3.77
(1.00)
0.57
(0.43)
4.37 *
(1.72)
IBK1M_CB 
1.60 ***
(4.60)
3.39 ***
(4.25)
1.26 ***
(4.04)
3.02 ***
(4.19)
Total Obs.  858  858  858  858
Tier 1 & 2
 regulatory capital ratio
Tier 1
 regulatory capital ratio
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Table 8. Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios for U.S. banks 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of U.S. publicly traded commercial 
banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets 
(T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), 
(1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)), the inverse of 
the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c)). A 
higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory 
variables. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance 
method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably 
endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Regulatory capital equation
LC 
-0.07 ***
(-3.75)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-3.23)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.06 ***
(-3.92)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-3.49)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.05 ***
(-3.53)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-3.85)
ROE
0.02 *
(1.71)
0.01
(1.24)
0.01
(1.11)
0.02 *
(1.87)
0.02
(1.40)
0.02
(1.28)
LLP_TLO
0.35 ***
(3.13)
0.25 **
(2.17)
0.33 ***
(2.80)
0.29 ***
(2.49)
0.18
(1.52)
0.28 **
(2.29)
MKT_DISC  -  -  - 
0.02
(0.48)
0.04
(0.83)
0.06
(1.35)
DIV_PYRT
-0.02 ***
(-4.60)
-0.02 ***
(-4.65)
-0.02 ***
(-4.32)
-0.02 ***
(-4.47)
-0.02 ***
(-4.45)
-0.02 ***
(-4.03)
MKT_BK_VAL 
0.001
(0.85)
0.001
(1.32)
0.001
(0.65)
0.002 **
(2.23)
0.002 ***
(2.70)
0.001 *
(1.75)
LN_TA
0.004 *
(1.76)
0.01 ***
(2.69)
0.01 ***
(3.14)
0.004 *
(1.87)
0.01 ***
(2.82)
0.01 ***
(3.16)
GDP_GWT 
0.03
(0.12)
-0.01
(-0.03)
-0.05
(-0.22)
0.07
(0.31)
0.05
(0.25)
0.10
(0.46)
Liquidity equation
K_RWA
0.54
(1.02)
1.04
(1.45)
1.49 *
(1.88)
0.72
(1.45)
1.25 **
(1.88)
1.35 **
(1.92)
MKT_POW
-1.53 *
(-1.73)
-1.19
(-0.88)
-1.63
(-0.76)
-1.72 *
(-1.83)
-1.66
(-1.21)
-2.78
(-1.43)
GDP_GWT 
2.15 ***
(2.64)
1.67
(1.50)
2.46 **
(2.30)
2.12 ***
(2.54)
1.55
(1.37)
2.34 **
(2.23)
CB 
-21.56
(-1.16)
-8.02
(-0.32)
-28.80
(-1.00)
-22.03
(-1.18)
-8.48
(-0.34)
-24.52
(-0.86)
IBK1M_CB 
0.71 *
(1.87)
1.38 ***
(2.66)
1.11 **
(2.14)
0.70 *
(1.84)
1.37 ***
(2.64)
1.15 **
(2.26)
Total Obs. 2786 2786 2781 2786 2786 2781
Tier 1 & 2
 regulatory capital ratio
Tier 1
 regulatory capital ratio
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Table 9. Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios separately for European and U.S. banks according to their size 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 
capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity 
creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each 
liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects 
in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing 
literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10. Liquidity and regulatory capital ratios separately for European and U.S. banks considering very large versus other large banks 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 
capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity 
creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each 
liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank very large if its total assets exceed US$50 billion (FED, 2011). Total assets of the other 
large banks vary between US$50 billion and US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the 
liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
0.01
(0.27)
 -  - 
-0.05
(-0.49)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.25)
 -  - 
0.001
(0.03)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.02
(-1.03)
 -  - 
-0.004
(-0.06)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-1.08)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.39)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
-0.09 ***
(-4.98)
 -  - 
-0.05
(-0.96)
 -  - 
-0.05 ***
(-2.78)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.83)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.50)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.13)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.67)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.15)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-4.96)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(2.08)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.91)
 -  - 
0.07 *
(1.86)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
-0.02
(-1.09)
 -  - 
-0.08 *
(-1.64)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-1.09)
 -  - 
-0.03 *
(-1.84)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.01
(-1.44)
 -  - 
-0.09 **
(-1.92)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-1.29)
 -  - 
-0.03 *
(-1.64)
 - 
Total Obs. 265 265  - 404 404  - 265 265  - 404 404  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
0.05
(0.25)
 -  - 
-0.10 ***
(-5.74)
 -  - 
-0.10
(-0.37)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-3.36)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
0.01
(0.04)
 -  - 
-0.08 ***
(-5.97)
 -  - 
0.20
(0.57)
 -  - 
-0.05 ***
(-3.29)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
0.03
(0.93)
 -  - 
-0.08 ***
(-5.65)
 -  - 
0.08
(1.12)
 -  - 
-0.05 ***
(-3.07)
Total Obs. 114 114 114 1075 1075 1070 114 114 114 1075 1075 1070
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Very Large banks Other Large banks Very Large banks Other Large banks
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1. Summary of the balance sheets weighting used to calculate net stable funding 
ratio as defined in the Basel III accords 
 
 
Source: BIS (2009). 
Available funding source
Availability 
factor
Tier 1 and 2 Capital Instruments
Other preferred shares and capital instruments in excess of 
Tier 2 allowable amount having an effective maturity of one 
year or greater
Other liabilities with an effective maturity of 1 year or 
greater
Less stable deposits of retail and small business customers 
(nonmaturity or residual maturity < 1yr)
0.85
Less stable deposits of retail and small business customers 
that are not covered by effective deposit insurance, high-
value deposits, internet deposits and foreign currency 
deposits (nonmaturity or residual maturity < 1yr)
0.7
Wholesale funding provided by nonfinancial corporate 
customers (nonmaturity or residual maturity < 1yr)
0.5
All other liabilities and equity not included above 0
Required funding source Required factor
Cash
Short-term unsecured actively traded instruments (< 1 yr)
Securities with exactly offsetting reverse repo
Securities with remaining maturity < 1 yr
Nonrenewable loans to financials with remaining maturity < 
1 yr
Debt issued or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, BIS, 
IMF, EC, non-central government, multilateral development 
banks
0.05
Unencumbered non-financial senior unsecured corporate 
bonds (or covered bonds) rated at least AA, maturity ≥ 1 yr 0.2
Unencumbered listed equity securities or nonfinancial senior 
unsecured corporate bonds (or covered bonds) rated at least 
A-, maturity ≥ 1 yr
Gold
Loans to nonfinancial corporate clients having a maturity < 1 
yr
Loans to retail clients having a maturity < 1 yr 0.85
All other assets 1
1
0
0.5
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1. Correlations among the main explanatory variables in the regulatory capital equation for U.S. and European listed 
commercial banks from 2000 to 2006 
 
 
All variables are expressed in percentage, except LN_TA, MKT_BK_VAL and CAP_REG. LC: liquidity creation / total assets; I_NSFR: required amount of stable funding / available amount of 
stable funding; ROE: net income / total equity; LLP_TLO loan loss provisions / total loans; MKT_DISC: subordinated debt / total debt; DIV_PYRT: common dividend / (net income – minority 
interests – preferred dividends); MKT_BK_VAL: market value of assets/ book value of assets; LN_TA: natural logarithm of total assets; GDP_GWT: annual growth rate of real GDP; CAP_REG: 
index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. Figures in italics indicate -values of the T-statistics that test for null hypothesis of Pearson’s coefficients of correlation equal to 0. 
LC I_NSFR ROA LLP_TLO MKT_DISC DIV_PYRT MKT_BK_VAL LN_TA GDP_GWT CAP_REG 
LC 1
I_NSFR 0.67 1
0.00
ROE 0.08 0.07 1
0.00 0.00
LLP_TLO 0.02 0.02 -0.20 1
0.16 0.10 0.00
MKT_DISC 0.08 0.14 0.11 -0.03 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
DIV_PYRT -0.20 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 1
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00
MKT_BK_VAL 0.12 -0.06 0.48 -0.13 0.06 0.06 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LN_TA 0.07 0.28 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.21 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GDP_GWT 0.03 -0.02 0.15 -0.18 0.02 -0.01 0.22 -0.03 1
0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.32 0.00 0.07
CAP_REG -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.14 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 0.10 1
0.09 0.90 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table B.2. Correlations among the main explanatory variables in the liquidity equation 
for U.S. and European listed commercial banks from 2000 to 2006 
 
 
 
All variables are expressed in percentage. T12_RWA: Tier 1 and 2 capital / total risk weighted assets; T1_RWA: Tier 1 capital / 
total risk weighted assets; MKT_POW: total assets of bank i in country j / total assets of the banking system in country j; 
GDP_GWT: annual growth rate of real GDP; CB: central bank policy rate; IBK1M_CB: spread of 1 month interbank rate and 
central bank policy rate. Figures in italics indicate -values of the T-statistics that test for null hypothesis of Pearson’s 
coefficients of correlation equal to 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T12_RWA T1_RWA
MKT_
POW 
GDP_GWT CB IBK1M_CB 
T12_RWA 1
T1_RWA 0.91 1
0.00
MKT_POW -0.13 -0.22 1
0.00 0.00
GDP_GWT 0.02 0.04 0.03 1
0.14 0.01 0.12
CB -0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.31 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IBK1M_CB -0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.12 0.13 1
0.21 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1. Including a proxy of market discipline in the capital equation with Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital ratio for European and U.S. banks 
according to their size 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is the Tier 1 and 2 
capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically 
for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We 
consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital 
and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table C.2. Considering Tier 1 and 2 regulatory capital buffer for European banks according to their size 
 
  
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of European publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The BUFFER variable is the Tier 1 and 2 
regulatory capital buffer by deleting the negative values of the variable. We define capital buffer as the amount of capital that a bank holds in excess of the minimum required to meet regulatory standards. This 
variable is computed as the difference between the total risk weighted capital ratio (i.e. the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets) and the regulatory minimum requirements. We take in account that 
regulators set the minimum requirement at 8% for the ratio of Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets, except in Cyprus where it is equal to 10% and in the United Kingdom where it is equal to 9% following 
Jokipii and Milne (2008). The liquidity variable is either the liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)) or the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)). A higher 
value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section 
and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably 
endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
0.02
(0.46)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.37)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.02
(-0.78)
 -  - 
0.02
(0.69)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
-0.09 ***
(-4.46)
 -  - 
-0.07
(-1.33)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.06 ***
(-4.54)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.13)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.05 ***
(-4.17)
 -  - 
0.06 *
(1.56)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
0.01
(0.26)
 -  - 
-0.05
(-0.49)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.02
(-1.03)
 -  - 
-0.004
(0.06)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks
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Table C.3. The case of “true commercial banks” for European and U.S. banks according to their size 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 
and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either 
the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher 
value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. Consistent with Berger and 
Bouwman (2009), to ensure that our sample only contains “true commercial banks”, we impose the following additional restrictions. We exclude a bank if it is very small (with total assets below US$25 million) 
and if it has consumer loans exceeding 50% of total assets. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital 
and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table C.4. Introducing bank size in the liquidity equation for European and U.S. banks according to their size 
 
  
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 
and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either 
the liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher 
value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We orthogonalize 
MKT_POW with LN_TA (MKT_POW_O) and we introduce LN_TA as additional explanatory variable in the liquidity equation. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory 
variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
0.14
(1.18)
 -  - 
0.20
(1.05)
 -  - 
0.14
(1.25)
 -  - 
0.004
(0.03)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.03
(-0.92)
 -  - 
0.31
(1.50)
 -  - 
-0.03
(-0.77)
 -  - 
0.16
(1.44)
 - 
Total Obs. 588 588  - 151 151  - 588 588  - 151 151  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
-0.10 ***
(-5.11)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-0.41)
 -  - 
-0.05 **
(-2.30)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.25)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.54)
 -  - 
0.03
(0.93)
 -  - 
-0.03 **
(-2.13)
 -  - 
0.03
(0.94)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-5.07)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(2.28)
 -  - 
-0.03 ***
(-2.53)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(2.17)
Total Obs. 1131 1131 1126 1436 1436 1436 1131 1131 1126 1436 1436 1436
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
0.01
(0.25)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-0.17)
 -  - 
0.02
(0.53)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.25)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.01
(-0.45)
 -  - 
-0.003
(-0.04)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.34)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.26)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
-0.10 ***
(-5.07)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.85)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-2.82)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.75)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.43)
 -  - 
0.003
(0.09)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.65)
 -  - 
0.004
(0.11)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-4.89)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(2.01)
 -  - 
-0.03 ***
(-2.72)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(1.89)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
  49
Table C.5. Orthogonalising LN_TA with MKT_POW in the liquidity equation for European and U.S. banks according to their size 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 
and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the 
liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher 
value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We orthogonalize LN_TA 
with MKT_POW and we introduce LN_TA_O as additional explanatory variable in the liquidity equation. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are 
presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table C.6. Replacing MKT_POW by LN_TA in the liquidity equation for European and U.S. banks according to their size 
 
  
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 
and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the 
liquidity creation indicator (LC in system (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in system (1.b)). Specifically for U.S., we also consider the core funding ratio (CFR in system (1.c)). A higher 
value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. In both the regulatory 
capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
0.01
(0.25)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-0.17)
 -  - 
0.02
(0.53)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.25)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.01
(-0.45)
 -  - 
-0.003
(-0.04)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.34)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.26)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
-0.10 ***
(-5.07)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.85)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-2.82)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.75)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.43)
 -  - 
0.003
(0.09)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.65)
 -  - 
0.004
(0.11)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-4.89)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(2.01)
 -  - 
-0.03 ***
(-2.72)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(1.89)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
LC 
-0.01
(-0.27)
 -  - 
-0.77 **
(-2.03)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.15)
 -  - 
-0.35
(-1.09)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.001
(-0.03)
 -  - 
-0.16
(-0.87)
 -  - 
0.003
(0.12)
 -  - 
-0.05
(-0.38)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC 
-0.10 ***
(-5.08)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.89)
 -  - 
-0.05 ***
(-2.38)
 -  - 
-0.04
(-0.80)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.45)
 -  - 
0.004
(0.10)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.51)
 -  - 
0.004
(0.09)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-4.80)
 -  - 
0.09 **
(2.19)
 -  - 
-0.03 ***
(-2.43)
 -  - 
0.08 **
(1.92)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
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Table C.7. Using a measure of liquidity creation adjusted for equity for European and 
U.S. banks according to their size 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded 
commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 capital to total risk weighted 
assets (T12_RWA) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA). The liquidity variable is an indicator of 
liquidity creation calculated by excluding equity (LC_EE). A higher value of this liquidity proxy indicates higher bank 
illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed 
US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section 
covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are 
presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
1. a 1. a 1. a' 1. a'
Panel A: European banks
LC_EE
0.002
(0.04)
-0.06
(-0.76)
-0.001
(-0.03)
-0.01
(-0.09)
Total Obs. 669 189 669 189
Panel B: U.S. banks
LC_EE
-0.08 ***
(-5.06)
0.01
(0.14)
-0.05 ***
(-2.75)
0.01
(0.23)
Total Obs. 1189 1597 1189 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
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Table C.8. Using alternative weights for stable deposits in the inverse of the net stable funding ratio for European and U.S. banks according to their 
size 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 
and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is an 
alternative specification of the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR) by changing the weight of 0.7 for demand and saving deposits. Three other weights are used: 0.5 (I_NSFR_D05 in systems (1.a) and 
(1.a)), 0.85 (I_NSFR_D085 in systems (1.b) and (1.b)), and 1 (I_NSFR_D1) in systems (1.c) and (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the 
explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In 
both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
I_NSFR_D05
-0.02
(-1.01)
 -  - 
-0.002
(-0.09)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-1.05)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.31)
 -  - 
I_NSFR_D085  - 
-0.03
(-1.02)
 -  - 
0.004
(0.09)
 -  - 
-0.03
(-1.06)
 -  - 
0.02
(0.45)
 - 
I_NSFR_D1  -  - 
-0.03
(-1.00)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.13)
 -  - 
-0.03
(-1.03)
 -  - 
0.02
(0.48)
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
I_NSFR_D05
-0.08 ***
(-5.47)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.20)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.76)
 -  - 
-0.002
(-0.05)
 -  - 
I_NSFR_D085  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.49)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.27)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.62)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.23)
 - 
I_NSFR_D1  -  - 
-0.07 ***
(-5.47)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.38)
 -  - 
-0.04 ***
(-2.58)
 -  - 
0.01
(0.29)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
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Table C.9. Using alternative liquidity proxies for European and U.S. banks according to their size 
 
  
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for unbalanced panels of European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 
and 2 capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). Alternative definitions of the 
liquidity variable are used in the regressions. IA_IL is an alternative definition of the Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation indicator. It is the ratio of illiquid assets to illiquid liabilities (in systems (1.a) and 
(1.a)). LTR is based on the LT gap of Deep and Schaefer (2004) and is the ratio of illiquid assets (i.e., total loans, long-term marketable assets, other assets and net fixed assets) to illiquid liabilities (i.e., time 
deposits, long-term market funding and equity, in systems (1.b) and (1.b)). CDR is based on the financing gap of Saunders and Cornett (2006) and is the ratio of total loans to total core deposits (in systems (1.c) 
and (1.c)). A higher value of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank large if its total assets exceed US$1 billion. We 
include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables 
which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c' 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
Panel A: European banks
IA_IL
-0.004
(-0.55)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.83)
 -  - 
-0.002
(-0.37)
 -  - 
-0.004
(-0.55)
 -  - 
LTR  - 
-0.005
(-0.59)
 -  - 
-0.001
(-0.10)
 -  - 
-0.004
(-0.46)
 -  - 
0.001
(0.26)
 - 
Total Obs. 669 669  - 189 189  - 669 669  - 189 189  - 
Panel B: U.S. banks
IA_IL
-0.10 ***
(-2.90)
 -  - 
-0.10 ***
(-6.04)
 -  - 
-0.06 ***
(-2.42)
 -  - 
-0.09 ***
(-4.94)
 -  - 
LTR  - 
0.14 **
(2.07)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-0.79)
 -  - 
0.08
(1.59)
 -  - 
-0.01
(-0.44)
 - 
CDR  -  - 
-0.01 ***
(-4.76)
 -  - 
0.05 ***
(3.11)
 -  - 
-0.01 ***
(-3.04)
 -  - 
0.04 ***
(2.63)
Total Obs. 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597 1189 1189 1184 1597 1597 1597
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
Large banks Small banks Large banks Small banks
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Table C.10. The case of small U.S. “community banks” 
 
  
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 
capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the 
liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c)). A higher value 
of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a U.S. bank as a “community bank” if its total assets are lower than US$1 billion, its 
ratio of total loans to total assets exceeds 33% and its ratio of total core deposits to total assets exceeds 50%. We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section 
covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged 
value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table C.11. The case of “very small” U.S. banks 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 
capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the 
liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c)). A higher value 
of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We consider a bank very small if its total assets is lower than US$500 million. We include cross-
section and time fixed effects in the regressions and we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are 
presumably endogenous in the existing literature are replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
LC 
-0.01
(-0.13)
 -  - 
-0.02
(-0.43)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
0.05
(1.52)
 -  - 
0.04
(1.05)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
0.17 ***
(3.41)
 -  - 
0.15 ***
(2.89)
Total Obs. 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
LC 
0.08
(1.53)
 -  - 
0.06
(1.04)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
0.12 ***
(3.59)
 -  - 
0.08 *
(1.67)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
0.10 ***
(3.49)
 -  - 
0.07 **
(2.04)
Total Obs. 884 884 884 884 884 884
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
  54
Table C.12. The case of small U.S. banks with a restricted access to financial markets 
 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM for an unbalanced panel of U.S. publicly traded commercial banks over the 2000–2006 period. The K_RWA variable is either the Tier 1 and 2 
capital to total risk weighted assets (T12_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)) or the Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (T1_RWA in systems (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c)). The liquidity variable is either the 
liquidity creation indicator (LC in systems (1.a) and (1.a)), the inverse of the net stable funding ratio (I_NSFR in systems (1.b) and (1.b)) or the core funding ratio (CFR in systems (1.c) and (1.c)). A higher value 
of each liquidity proxy indicates higher bank illiquidity. See Table 5 for the definition of the explanatory variables. We include only the small banks with a restricted access to financial markets, i.e., with a null 
subordinated debt and a ratio of total market debts to total debts lower than the median calculated on the whole sample of U.S. banks (11.7%). We include cross-section and time fixed effects in the regressions and 
we use the White cross-section covariance method. In both the regulatory capital and the liquidity equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are 
replaced by their one-year lagged value. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
1. a 1. b 1. c 1. a' 1. b' 1. c'
LC 
-0.30 ***
(-3.83)
 -  - 
-0.55 ***
(-4.88)
 -  - 
I_NSFR  - 
0.46 ***
(4.23)
 -  - 
0.44 ***
(4.77)
 - 
CFR  -  - 
0.14 ***
(2.85)
 -  - 
0.18 ***
(3.89)
Total Obs. 788 788 788 788 788 788
Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio
